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A COMPLEX(ITY) STRATEGY FOR 
BREAKING THE LOGJAM 
BETH S. NOVECK• AND DAVID R. JOHNSON•• 
In this essay, we explore how the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) might use technology to improve the agency's level 
of scientific expertise and to obtain useful information sooner to 
inform EPA policymaking. By creating a self-reinforcing 
collaboration between government and networked publics, new 
web-based tools could help produce change within government 
and without-namely governmental decisions informed by better 
data obtained through citizen participation and civic. action 
coordinated with governmental priorities. The agency has the 
opportunity to help break the logjam of environmental 
policymaking by developing transparent and participatory 
mechanisms for expert citizen participation. The key insight is not 
to throw open the floodgates to undifferentiated public input, but 
to design group-based processes that enable online communities to 
collaborate on finding and vetting information for agencies. 
After expanding on our core argument and addressing initial 
counter-arguments, we briefly discuss the current state of public 
participation. We then discuss the potential for technology to 
create more effective collaboration by uniting experts from 
multiple disciplines and both the public and private spheres. To 
illustrate how technology can facilitate collaboration between 
agency and public, we use the Peer-to-Patent pilot program, 
recently adopted by the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office. We. conclude by discussing innovative ways that EPA 
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could integrate similar methods into its decision-making processes·. 
I. A COMPLEX APPROACH 
Extending the intelligence of governmental institutions by 
connecting them to networks of collaborating groups provides the 
prospect for evolving appropriately complex solutions to the 
world's increasingly challenging environmental problems. As 
Hayek pointed out, centralized planning is prone to failure due to 
the inability to aggregate distributed knowledge. 1 Rather than 
asking simply how the law can be amended to improve the 
environment (or how government or corporations should work), 
we can focus on how we can catalyze the rich social processes that 
allow both centralized governmental institutions and large 
numbers of people to work together to improve our environmental 
condition. 
Individuals considered in isolation, perhaps participating one-
on-one in voting or in markets, have little ability to spur 
environmental improvements. Though new pricing schemes might 
change incentives, individual members of the public lack sufficient 
inforination and power to affect broad change. They usually act 
according to self-interest and overgraze the commons. Thus, we 
tend to be skeptical about the value of changing our light bulbs or 
reducing the air in our tires when juxtaposed against a sweeping 
international treaty even when such treaties are slow in coming and 
easily countermanded. 
But decentralized, individual action is not the only alternative. 
Connecting individuals to institutions through networks helps to 
produce large-scale social change. We think better when we think 
together. Collaboration yields better information and we should 
want government to make the best-informed decisions possible. 
But collaboration also enables individuals to become more 
effective. The more effective we can become as individuals by 
participating in communities of governance, the more powerful we 
can become as citizens participating in the life of our democracy.2 
1 See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 34 AM. ECON. 
REV. 519, 519-20 (1945). Though Hayek focused on the economic implications 
of disaggregated knowledge, his contention also applies to the law. 
2 "When done well, public participation improves the quality and legitimacy 
of a decision and builds the capacity of all involved to engage in the policy 
process. It can lead to better results in terms of environmental quality and other 
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In addition to changing outmoded laws, we should also strive to 
create new social organizations that bring government institutions 
and the public together to collaborate on setting environmental 
priorities and affecting widespread change. 
Congress has failed to pass a major piece of environmental 
legislation since 1990. As the organizers of the Breaking the 
Logjam symposium note: "The result is that many environmental 
problems remain unresolved: the oceans have become increasingly 
degraded and their fish stocks depleted, urban sprawl and traffic 
congestion threaten our ecosystems, and factory farms contaminate 
the environment in many parts of the country. And the U.S. has 
been unable to successfully deal with many new environmental 
problems, most prominently climate change."3 This volume's 
reformist call-to-arms-consonant with a growing body of legal 
scholarship about regulatory and institutional pluralism4-also 
imagines that new ways of working are necessary, such as 
developing approaches that cut across regulatory silos and using 
market mechanisms as leverage, such as in congestion pricing 
strategies. 
But this vision assumes the unchanging permanence of the 
design of government institutions. In particular, it assumes that the 
administrative state must continue to be the expert decision-maker, 
rather than envisioning the state as a coordinator of actions by a 
wider array of participants. At the very least, traditional reform 
approaches, even ones that attempt to be cross-institutional, fail to 
envision a role for greater citizen participation in decision-making. 
The new science of complex systems5 suggests that people 
social objectives. It also can enhance trust and understanding among parties." 
COMM. ON THE HUMAN DIMENSIONS OF GLOBAL CHANGE, NAT'L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT DECISION 
MAKING 9-3 (Thomas Dietz & Paul C. Stem eds., 2008), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/ 12434 .html. 
3 BREAKING THE LOGJAM: AN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY, BACKGROUND OF THE BREAKING THE LOGJAM PROJECT, 
http://wwwl.law.nyu.edu/conferences/btl/background.html (last visited Oct. 20, 
2008). 
4 See, e.g., Paul S. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. R.Ev. 
1155 (2007). 
5 This is a vast new field of scientific inquiry, spurred by collaborative work 
at the Santa Fe Institute and applicable to biological, economic and social 
systems. Many in the environmental area will find this familiar. Outlining the 
substance of this science is obviously beyond the scope of this article, but we 
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could become a key component of any solution to environmental 
problems when organized together in groups ( online) and when 
coordinating their actions with those of others (most importantly 
including government). This is because social organisms have the 
ability to repair themselves and replicate; they evolve when 
interactions reach a critical level of complexity. Through social 
interaction-when specific roles and tasks are well-defined to 
enable collaboration-groups of people can better achieve their 
goals. Rethinking environmental policy demands becoming better 
at creating the conditions under which group power flourishes. 
Complex systems science teaches us that organisms (indeed, 
life itself) flourish(es) at a "sweet spot" between randomness and 
rigidity. That is to say, the complex flow of signals among 
autonomous agents becomes richer and more diverse . when 
ambient conditions allow just enough flexibility to adapt to new 
challenges and just enough order to allow the persistence and 
replication necessary to enable evolution to operate. For more 
complex social systems, this means that the primary goals of any 
governmental effort should be to ( 1) recognize whether relevant 
social subsystems have moved too far towards the random or rigid 
side of the continuum (as they do when we become constrained by 
outmoded environmental legislation and regulation) and (2) 
intervene to nudge these systems back towards the sweet spot in 
the middle, opening it up to new signals and interactions. 
We believe that one answer to our environmental challenges 
is to be found in enabling people acting together in groups to 
accomplish goals they conceive to be in furtherance of an 
environmental improvement. Want to clean up a local park? 
Enlist the neighbors. Want to shut down a polluting company? 
Enlist the customers. Want to encourage everyone to use less 
energy? Enlist a movement of people who will spread the word 
about the benefits of energy conservation. Want to find out what 
level of protection is appropriate for certain areas of the sea? 
include in the body of the article the main points we think are relevant for 
planning new approaches to governmental (and public) action to solve 
environmental problems. See· generally THE BIOLOGY OF BUSINESS: DECODING 
THE NATURAL LAWS OF ENTERPRISE (John Clippinger ed., 1999); JOHN 
HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER: How ADAPTATION BUILDS COMPLEXITY (1996); 
STUART A. KAUFFMAN, THE ORIGINS OF ORDER: SELF-ORGANIZATION AND 
SELECTION IN EVOLUTION (1993). 
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Enlist an army of volunteers to collect and study the relevant data. 
Make a movie. Make a movement. Do not just' write laws. Do 
not just complain to those who do. 
II. CHANGING NATURE OF EXPERTISE 
Before we move to addressing concrete examples of how EPA 
might beneficially adapt to networks, we must first unpack two 
ideas-and thereby address two counter-arguments-implicit in 
this discussion of collaboration and complexity. First, in this 
section, we address the myth that government knows best. This 
applies whether we are talking about Congress or agencies, 
government at the federal, state, or local levels. In the next 
section, we address how networked publics are in any way 
different from the corporations, interest groups, and other 
organizations that currently populate the Beltway ecosystem and 
participate in policy-making. 
In a democracy, citizens typically rely on a professional elite 
to make specific administrative decisions in the public interest. 
Governmental professionals decide on acceptable levels of 
mercury emissions in the air, anti-discrimination rules in education 
and the workplace, and the standards for cross-ownership of . 
newspapers and broadcasting stations. 
The notion that government officials can deal in a limited 
amount of time with complex information regarding the global 
economy is a myth. Poor decision-making leads to grave 
consequences for jobs, the economy, education, healthcare, and 
every issue of importance. Even in the absence of personally 
corrupt motives (and independent of political value preferences), 
the bureaucrat in Washington often lacks access to the right 
information or to the expertise necessary to make sense of a welter 
of available information. In a survey of environmental lawyers, 
for example, only 8 percent of respondents strongly agreed that the 
EPA has sufficient time to search for relevant science before 
making_ a decision about environmental policy and only 6 percent 
strongly believed that agencies employed adequate analysis in their 
decision-making.6 In the United States Patent Office, the 
examiner, who is tasked with deciding which invention will 
6 J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, In Defense of Regulatory Peer Review, 84 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 26 (2006). 
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receive a twenty-year grant of monopoly rights,_ has little more 
than a dozen hours in which to do all the research and write up a 
decision. 
A handful of professionals in a government agency is unlikely 
to possess as much information as the many dispersed individuals 
in the field. Indeed, in the 2006 IBM Global CEO Study, when 
asked where they looked for fresh ideas, corporate chief executives 
cited clients, business partners, and employees far more than their 
own research and development labs. 7 This supports the popular 
adage: No matter who you are, most of the smartest people work 
for someone else. Known as Joy's Law (for Bill Joy, the co-
founder of Sun Microsystems), this quip pinpoints the core 
challenge faced by all organizations in an exploding information 
ecosystem, where most knowledge is outside the boundaries of the 
institution, including govemment.8 In today's age of networks, 
Joy's Law implies opportunity through shared resources, not the 
problem of limited resources. 
Empirical work demonstrates that people are more effective 
when they work together as a group. As Stephen Kosslyn, Chair 
of the Harvard Department of Psychology and head of the Harvard 
"Group Brain" project explains, working together allows us to 
utilize many different tools. Because we "simply [do not] have 
enough genes to program the brain fully in advance," we must 
extend 'our own intelligence with what he terms social prosthetic 
systems.9 At the most basic level, we need to pool our diverse 
knowledge and skills. Even institutions need prosthetic extensions 
to make themselves smarter and.more effective. We can use the 
Internet to assemble more capable teams, drawing on expertise 
across disciplines and the public/private divide. 
Similarly, dividing a policy problem into smaller parts so that 
collaborative teams can work on it facilitates openness and 
innovation. This openness may not just help government do its job 
7 Press Release, IBM, Majority of Global CEOs Plan Fundamental Change 
and Expect New Forms oflnnovation to Drive Growth (Mar. l, 2006), available 
at http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/ 19289. wss. 
8 Karim R. Lakhani & Jill A. Panetta, The Principles of Distributed 
Innovation, 2 INNOVATIONS: TECH., GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION 97, (2007), 
available at http://www.mitpressjoumals.org/doi/pdf/l O. l l 62/itgg.2007.2.3.97. 
9 Stephen M. Kosslyn, On the Evolution of Human Motivation: The Role of 
Social Prosthetic Systems, in EVOLUTIONARY COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 541, 
543 (S.M. Platek, T.K. Shackelford & J.P. Keenan eds., 2006). 
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better; it can introduce the problem to more people, allowing 
competition for solutions to emerge. Impelled by a government 
mandate, the private sector and civil society might suggest their 
own solutions. If we use netWork technologies to construct the 
architecture of participation, we can elicit more valuable 
contributions from citizens. But making this happen requires some 
coordination. That is where state institutions can still play a vital 
role. 
We already have an architecture of policy-making that 
involves a wide array of actors. Corporations participate through 
lobbyists and notice-and-comment rulemaking. Non-governmental 
organizations funnel information to government through think-
tanks and their whitepapers and publications. Interest groups also 
lobby and enlist their members to respond-usually with postcards 
and email-in rulemaking and legislative policymaking. With so 
many groups already involved, it is not clear how online, 
networked groups are different. It is also not clear what will 
prevent new, networked publics from becoming as entrenched as 
the lobbying culture that contributed to the logjam in the first 
place. Inviting more public participation is not simply a 
duplication of current notice and comment processes or a recipe 
for a different form of lobbying. If we create the right practices, 
we create structures to reward participation and encourage high-
quality contributions, hard work, and good behavior, even as we 
create disincentives for manipulation and abuse. 
First, giving ordinary people-as distinct from corporations 
and interest groups-the right and ability to participate enables 
them to form new groups better suited to address new problems. 
Alone, there is not much any one person can do to bring about 
change or to participate meaningfully and usefully in a 
policymaking process. But, working together, a group can take 
action at scale. Additionally, the network structure allows groups 
to remain sufficiently adaptable, so that group action can 
continuously adjust to address the most pressing problems. Online 
groups can change their collective goals more quickly than can 
traditional organizations that hire full time employees and lock-in 
around their own institutional and individual priorities. 
Second, workirig in networked groups that convene people of 
diverse skills and shared enthusiasm expands the range of ways in 
which people can participate. The practice of using technology to 
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make information gathering a more collaborative part of policy-
making, not only by making more people aware of a problem but 
also by pulling more people into the work of government, begins 
to take the bureaucracy out of bureaucracy. It can augment the 
official's social toolbox with the capacities and skills of non-
governmental experts. 
Third, by opening up the decision-making process to group 
participation, we may begin to create feedback loops that go 
beyond mere data-gathering and, instead, create communities of 
collaborative action that engage even more people m 
environmental reform. 
III. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION TODAY 
At present, engaging with the public does not always produce 
good results. Traditional forms of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking solicit expertise too late in the process after draft 
regulations are already a fait accompli. 10 The participation in 
response to notice-and-comment rulemaking suffers from 
problems of quality. Critics complain of a range of defects, from 
regulatory capture--excessive influence of regulators by those 
stakeholders whom they regulate-to excessive participation by 
individuals who carp but offer little information to inform the 
process. 11 Because the playing field is biased towards legal and 
interest group professionals, it is often only interested parties 
"inside the Beltway" who provide information to the agency. 12 At 
the same time, potential participants overburden the regulator with 
"postcard comments," written and duplicated by an interest group 
without offering any new information to the decision-maker. 13 
While science advisory boards and peer review (and science 
review panels) help to introduce expert information into agency 
practices, these methodologies have limitations. At first glance, it 
would seem that peer review is a fairly conservative means to 
attack the information quality problem and provide much needed · 
oversight and accountability. But the biases of participants chosen 
10 Beth Simone NJlveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 
EMORY L.J. 433, 454 (2004). 
11 Id. at 455. 
12 Id. at 453. 
13 Id. at 479-80. 
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for peer review inevitably skew the process. There is no assurance 
of transparency in participant selection. Peer review notoriously 
produces a buddy system in which insiders reward friends and 
punish enemies. And the high cost of having to select peers and 
administer review means that people can only wind the machinery 
into gear on limited occasions. 
By empanelling peers, rather than allowing them to self-
select, the agency misses out on relevant sources of expertise. 
Typically, decision-makers invite only certain kinds of industry 
and academic experts to participate in peer review processes. 
Those limitations need not be based on politics-though a political 
litmus test is sometimes imposed (as has often been the case in the 
Bush Administration)-but may also be based on profession and 
thereby foreclose disciplinary diversity. Or the practices might 
derive from status and thereby shut out otherwise qualified 
participants with meaningful contributions. There are those who 
possess a great deal of expertise but do not necessarily have the 
"right" credentials. Thus, science advisory boards have limited 
usefulness. 
However, when agencies open regulatory processes to public 
comment, agencies often are overwhelmed by comments, many of 
which are unusable. The EPA received over half a million 
comments in response to its Clean Air Mercury rulemaking in 
2004. Only 4,500 of these were unique. 14 These postcard 
comments often have more to do with interest groups mining for 
data and donations from potential members than informing 
policymakers.· Either rulemakings receive no response, or there is 
an avalanche of identical comments. In many cases, prolix 
comments arrive at the eleventh hour, hand-delivered minutes 
before the deadline to thwart instant electronic access to the 
comments of corporate rivals. 
Some agencies have attempted to introduce technology into 
the consultative process, but these have not improved decision-
making practices as much as they inight. In the United States E-
Government Act of 2002, Congress legislated "e-rulemaking" to 
put the AP A public comment process online and "improve the 
14 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CONTROLLING POWER PLANT EMISSIONS: 
PUBLIC COMMENTS, http://www.epa.gov/mercury/control_emissions/ 
comment.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2008). 
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quality and use of Federal information to strengthen 
decisionmaking". 15 While thirty agencies were already using the 
Web to put notice of rulemaking activity on the Internet and make 
relevant documents available in electronic form, e-rulemaking 
consolidated activity and spending (and therefore power) around 
one, centralized website under the control of the Office of 
Management and Budget. 16 But the digitization of citizen 
participation practices has not worked well. The Regulations.gov 
website merely lists a draft rule and provides a box and a button to 
"click here for comment." The web has made it easier for 
machines or "bots," rather than people, to send electronic 
comments via the website, further deluging the agencies with 
unusable information. The FCC received hundreds of thousands of 
comments in response to its proposed rule weakening the standards 
for cross-ownership of broadcasting outlets. 17 Online participation 
is evolving from notice-and-comment into "notice and spam."18 
The design of the electronic process, as distinct from the 
traditional, paper-based form of participation, does not encourage 
better-informed participation or greater representation of those 
who are not participating in the process. While e-commenting 
makes the opportunity to comment more accessible, employees do 
not organize nor sort the blizzard of comments on regulations.gov 
by any meaningful search criteria. Comments are not deliberative; 
they do not respond to one another but are one-off communiques 
between submitter and agency. When the Forest Service ran a 
controversial rulemaking in 2000 to make one-third of the lands 
under the National Park Service's control free from road 
construction, it allowed people to submit comments online but .did 
not allow submitters to see one another's comments. 19 
With so many comments, commentators as well as agency 
officials do not have the resources to consider the merits of each 
and formulate considered replies. In some agencies, the review of 
15 E-Government Act of2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3501(4) (2000). 
16 REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov (last visited Aug. 15, 
2008). 
17 Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and 
Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943, 954, 956--57 (2006). 
18 Noveck, supra note 13, at 441. 
19 Stuart Shulman et al., Electronic Rulemaking: A Public Participation 
Research Agenda for the Social Sciences, 21 Soc. SCI. COMPUTER REv. 162, 
163-64 (2003). 
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comments has to be outsourced. In a study of Regulations.gov in 
2003, the U.S. General Accounting Office found that the website 
did not generate a steadier stream of useable comments.20 As 
University of Pennsylvania rulemaking scholar Cary Coglianese 
notes, the introduction of online commenting "has not had any 
substantial impact on public participation in rulemaking."21 
Perhaps surprisingly, the advent of e-commenting has increased 
paper-based submissions as some believe that taking up space on 
the regulator's desk will increase the likelihood of being heard. 
IV. TECHNOLOGY'S POTENTIAL IMPACT 
Technology has the potential to greatly improve public 
contributions to regulatory decision-making. A technological turn 
toward networked, collaborative governance would enable us now 
to work in groups across distance and institutional boundaries. 
Technology can reinforce the sense of working as a group by re-
creating some of the conditions of face-to-face work environments 
that build trust and belonging even without the benefit of physical 
proximity. 
Sixty million people use the Firefox Browser. Ten thousand 
of them participate in building and testing it. By asking a 
community to help fix bugs in the software and rewrite the code, 
the organization begins to rely more and more on its community. 
As the community comes to be more involved, control becomes 
dispersed. Everyone in the network has an influence. What begins 
as a set of practices for information gathering may result in 
feedback loops that, in turn, create communities of collaborative 
action and engage even more people. 
Similarly, if we start to think about taking a policy problem 
and dividing it up into smaller parts so that it can be distributed 
and worked on by collaborative teams, we begin to drive towards 
openness and innovation. And this is why inviting more public 
participation is not simply a recipe for a different form of 
lobbying. As in the Mozilla context, if we create the right 
2° Cary Coglianese, The Internet and Citizen Participation in Rulemaking, 1 
I/S: J.L. & PoL'Y INFO. Soc'y 33, 52 (2005); Coglianese, supra note 17, at 954-
55. The study was conducted shortly after the site's creation but even a year 
after its creation, the site had not generated significantly more comments. 
21 Coglianese, supra note 17, at 954. 
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practices, we can evolve norms and structures to reward 
participation and encourage high-quality contributions, hard work, 
and good behavior, even as we create disincentives for 
manipulation and abuse. 
V. FROM DECISION-MAKER TO COORDINATOR: 
ASKING GRANULAR QUESTIONS 
"Crowdsourcing will not create any genuinely new things," 
unless people know what is being asked of them.22 Wikipedia 
users know what to do because they understand what it means to 
write a "neutral viewpoint" entry to an encyclopedia. People share 
a common image of that collective go~l. Few people have a strong 
preconception about how best to participate in governmental 
decision-making. Thus, it is essential to articulate the questions, a 
task that is just as hard for those asking as for those answering. 
The online collaborative endeavor that produced the Linux 
operating system took off because Linus Torvalds, then just a 
teenager living in Finland and not yet the leader of a world 
movement in Silicon Valley, asked for help porting the Minux 
how-to-make-an-operating-system teaching tool to his own 
computer.23 His very specific question galvanized the contributing 
community. 
Ask a hard, specific question and you will get a good, specific 
answer. A granular question will attract a larger potential pool of 
self-selected solvers. Getting governmental authorities to 
communicate their needs to citizens so that people understand 
what is being asked of th.em is vital to ensuring that environmental 
activists can supply information to government in manageable and 
useful ways. 
What does this mean in practice? Imagine if, in connection 
with every notice-and-comment .rulemaking, an agency had to 
articulate ten questions to which it needed responses in . order to 
draft the final rule. Or, better yet, what if it asked these questions 
22 Video recording: Jay Rosen, The Future of Professionally Created 
Content, Address at the Legal Futures Conference, Stanford Law School (Mar. 8, 
2008) available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/calendar/details/1594/ 
#related_information_and_recordings. 
23 
ERIC STEVEN RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR (2000), 
available at http://gnuwin.epfl.ch/articles/en/cathedralbazaar/cathedral-
bazaar.pdf. 
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before the drafting process begins. Technology can make it 
possible to disseminate specific questions and gather useful 
responses in every domain. 
It may seem simplistic to propose this as a core innovation 
because its absence from the practices of public policymaking is 
profound. We are suggesting that government ask relevant and 
useful questions of more audiences. Because of our entrenched 
culture of expertise, believing that institutional actors are in the 
best position to make decisions in the public interest, agencies 
rarely ask the public for more than an opinion on pending 
regulation. 
Asking questions specifically not only helps to identify the 
tasks that need to be done but provides the rationale to the 
participating contributors for doing them. If people are to give of 
their limited time, they need to know the context for their 
involvement. Framing the question. is important to ensuring that 
work that is being asked of them is not mere "make work" nor 
unduly broad in scope (i.e., solve the climate change crisis) 
because in most cases it will not be paid labor. People need to be 
able to accomplish something working in short bursts of online 
collaboration. 
Certain kinds of decisions lend themselves to aggregating 
answers across a network. Sometimes those are questions that 
require brute numbers of participants. This aggregation may be 
automated. The SETI@Home project is an experiment that uses 
Internet-connected computers in the Search for Extraterrestrial 
Intelligence (SETI). Networking software allows people to break 
large projects into discrete units that multiple users or computers 
can complete, combining small efforts of thousands to complete 
large, complex and time-consuming tasks. The SETI@home 
project24 links hundreds of thousands of computers together to 
share their excess processing power, allowing researchers to search 
for extraterrestrial life among millions of images. 
Other projects, rather than just use surplus processing power, 
harness individuals' brainpower. The NASA Clickworkers 
project, rather than just use surplus computing power, trains 
individuals with no prior scientific background to classify the age 
of craters and landforms on Mars from images taken by various 
24 SETI@HOME, http://setiathome.berkeley.edu/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2008). 
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spacecraft.25 NASA combined the volunteers' contributions to 
create a map of the ages of different regions of Mars. 
Networks can also allow thousands of users to contribute and 
aggregate their own information. Photosynth lets large numbers of 
people take pictures and assembles their work whether for citizen 
science or other goals, including documenting geographic spaces 
and communities.26 Mapufacture27 enables collaborative map 
building. Mapufacture lets people build maps and data sets on 
their own or by building off of publicly available geospatial 
documents, assisting a "non-profit that wants to share information 
·about an area you're helping--or a relief worker who wants to 
make it easier for people in the field to get the information that is 
useful to them when and where they need it. "28 It is a small step 
from this to asking citizens to provide GIS locations for 
environmental hazards or to crowdsource data about clean air or 
water in their communities. 
More complex collaborations are also possible. Some 
questions require more than a yes/no or multiple choice answer. 
An organization may need to identify but not aggregate a large 
number of answers across a network. Many problems lend 
themselves to different solutions. This "wiki-style" approach to 
collecting information engages people in identifying the pieces to 
solve a complex problem. Where there is no one right answer, this 
approach can help in forming a strategy and setting regulatory 
priorities. 
Networking technology also makes prediction markets 
possible. Prediction markets take advantage of new technology to 
automate the aggregation of discrete votes from people.29 James 
25 Michael Szpir, Clickworkers on Mars, 90 AM. SCIENTIST 226 (2002). 
26 MICROSOFT LIVE LABS, Photosynth, http://labs.Iive.com/photosynth/ (last 
visited Aug. 15, 2008). 
27 MAPUFACTURE, http://mapufacture.com/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2008). 
2s Id. 
29 Some examples of prediction markets are Simon and Schuster's new 
MediaPredict project, which encourages readers to guess which manuscripts will 
become best-sellers, MEDIAPREDICT, http://mediapredict.com (last visited Aug. 
15, 2008); the Iowa Electronic Markets, which have been successful at guessing 
the results of presidential elections, UNIVERSITY OF low A COLLEGE OF BUSINESS, 
IOWA ELECTRONIC MARKETS, http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem (last visited Aug. 
15, 2008); and the Hollywood Stock Exchange, which does remarkably well at 
predicting Oscar winners, HOLLYWOOD STOCK EXCHANGE, http://www.hsx.com 
(last visited Aug. 15, 2008). 
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Surowiecki's The Wisdom of Crowds has popularized the idea that 
people can use technology to create aggregated predictions that are 
more accurate than those of any individual. 30 Such "prediction 
markets" are empirically good at reducing uncertainty and can be 
useful for identifying "big mistakes."31 Business is increasingly 
turning to online predictive mechanisms to aggregate private 
information to inform decision-making. Unlike traditional voting 
or polling, such "markets" require the participant to back up his 
guess with a bet, usually using fake currency or points. A tool site 
called "Kluster" allows users to set up projects and then to "invest 
in" those projects.32 In other words, it makes it possible to bet on a 
project's likely success and thereby establish a futures market to 
drive good ideas. These probabilistic mechanisms are not always 
accurate and we are still learning when they work, but they are one 
way of aggregating discrete answers to inform a decision. 
In addition to questions to which there is an answer that 
people can arrive at by prediction or those which require 
aggregating information, there are those questions for which the 
pieces of the answers are already identified but demand evaluating, 
drawing connections, and making sense of conflicting 
information. Again, new technology can be useful at enabling 
distributed networks to collaborate on data analysis and evaluation. 
VI. PEER-TO-PA TENT 
By way of example, the Peer-to-Patent: Community Patent 
Review pilot (www.peertopatent.org) is a new architecture of 
participation.33 This first experiment with web-based collaboration 
30 JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS {2004). 
31 See CASS SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: How MANY MINDS PRODUCE 
KNOWLEDGE (2006); see also KENNETH J. ARROW ET AL, AEl-BROOKINGS JOINT 
CTR. FOR REGULATORY STUDIES, STATEMENT ON PREDICTION MARKETS (2007), 
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=984584. Its authors define prediction 
markets as "markets for contracts that yield payments based on the outcome of 
an uncertain future event, such as a presidential election." Id. at 1. 
32 Bob Tedeschi, Putting Innovation in the Hands of a Crowd, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 3, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/03/technology/03ecom.html? 
_r= I &scp= 1 &sq=kluster&st=cse&oref=slogin. 
33 For background on Peer-to-Patent, see PEER-TO-PATENT PROJECT: 
COMMUNITY PATENT REVIEW, http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent (last 
visited Aug. 15, 2008). See also Beth Simone Noveck, Peer To Patent: 
Collective Intelligence, Open Review, And Patent Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH.123 (2006). 
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between a government institution and a community of participating 
volunteers online links the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office to an open network of scientific/technical experts. 
Launched in June 2007, the Peer-to-Patent program solicits 
public participation in the patent examination process via the Web 
at http://www.peertopatent.org. As part of the process by which 
the patent examiner determines whether the patent applicant has 
met the legal standards set forth by the Patent Act,. the Peer-to-
Patent program, serving as an adjunct to the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO), frames questions so as to solicit only 
that information which is relevant to the pending patent 
application, and invites the public to respond. Because responding 
to the questions requires enthusiasm and expertise, participants are 
self-selecting. Because the questions are honed and targeted, the 
public submits information that is useful to the agency. Public 
citizens research the pending patent application, uploading relevant 
publications for use by the patent examiner. The public does not 
take over the substantive work of the official patent examiner, but 
augments it by collectively compiling pertinent citations to prior 
art. As a result, the public plays a significant role in the patent 
decision-making process. 
On a small scale, Peer-to-Patent has empirically demonstrated 
the inadequacy of prior assumptions about the need to centralize 
all aspects of administrative decision-making. In this Patent Office 
experiment, non-governmental actors provide information-
serious, expert, fact-based, experiential, scientific information-
that government can use to enhance its decision-making. In its 
first year, the Peer-to-Patent pilot showed that the public is in 
possession of useful information not available to the patent 
examiner and, despite the complexity of the patent examination 
process, will take the time to contribute the information. Amateurs 
possess extraordinary expertise. The non-governmental public 
includes "experts" in a variety of fields, including scientific, 
economic, mathematical, and other relevant areas who can help 
produce and vet information in the decision-making process in a 
timely fashion. 
Government officials would do their jobs more effectively if 
they could access better information through collaboration with 
those able to supply it. For example, in 2007 Congress mandated 
and the President signed a switchover to new, energy-efficient 
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light bulbs and instructed the EPA to implement the law into 
regulations.34 The agency, however, did not have a plan in place 
for disposing of the 300 million mercury-containing fluorescents 
sold each year in the U.S. Understandably, given the demands of 
global climate change and the challenges of election year lame 
duck politics, the agency was too busy to have light bulbs on its 
radar screen. But without imposing any significant additional 
costs, the. agency could have set up a simple, online platform 
whereby a network of concerned citizens, in coordination with the 
EPA, could have identified this problem and possible solutions. 
Had the agency articulated the question well, not only would it 
have received coordinated responses but private sector companies 
might also have stepped up to offer mercury reclamation 
programs; foundations might have funded prizes to social 
entrepreneurs who devised effective solutions. 
Or, take another example (which we will discuss in greater 
detail). Under the Clean Air Act, EPA has to draft an Air Quality 
Criteria Document, setting forth a preliminary assessment of air 
quality prior to setting standards.35 Instead of turning to a dozen 
agency-selected experts for help, it could consult a network of self-
selected as well as invited online advisors. In developing its 
assessment, the EPA could put relevant queries to the scientific 
community. Experts can invite other experts. The consultation 
can take place both early in the process and, again, once the 
document is drafted. 
Law professors Josh Eagle, James N. Sanchirico, and Barton 
H. Thompson, Jr., participants in Breaking the Logjam, suggest 
that the oceans be zoned to mitigate problems of overfishing, 
damage to marine habitats, accidental mortality of non-fished 
34 Claudia H. Deutsch, No Joke, Bulb Change Is Challenge for U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2007, at Cl, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/22/business/22light.html?scp=5&sq=incandes 
cent%20lightbulbs&st=cse. For more on mercury in light bulbs, see U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, MERCURY-CONTAINING LIGHT BULB (LAMP) RECYCLING, 
http://www.epa.gov/epawaste/hazard/wastetypes/universal/lamps/index.htm (last 
visited Aug. 20, 2008). For background on the situation preceding legislation, 
see Matthew Wald, A U.S. Alliance to Update the Light Bulb, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
14, 2007, at C3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/14/business/ 
14light.html?scp= 1 &sq= A %20U .S. %20Alliance%20to%20Update%20the%20L 
ight%20Bulb&st=cse. 
35 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a) (2000). 
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species, and other challenges to the health of our seas. In this plan, 
commercial fisheries, recreational fishermen, conservationists, and 
other stakeholder groups would assume responsibility for different 
ocean zones. Now imagine that we apply a collaborative approach 
to this interesting proposal as well.· A federal agency such as the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration might usefully 
set up a process and online platform for each of these stakeholder 
groups to develop policy, solicit information and feedback, and 
thereby take responsibility for managing its zone of the ocean in an 
informed, open, and expert fashion. 
VII. Two PRACTICAL INNOVATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENT AL 
POLICYMAKING: CIVIC JURIES AND POLICY WII<IS 
One example of citizen collaboration is the Danish Consensus 
Conference, a type of small-group "citizen jury" that the Danes 
convene to vet policymaking relating to complex scientific and 
technological issues.36 The Danish Board of Technology is an 
independent body that advises the Danish Parliament about science 
and technology issues like food quality and human health, IT 
security, and free public transport. The Board uses a variety of 
deliberative methodologies, including the Consensus Conference 
methodology to give parliament a. sense of public opinion on 
difficult, scientific policy issues. The method involves convening 
a focus group of about sixteen people from among interested 
members of the general public. Sometimes the group meets for 
two days at a time over several weeks; at other times the meeting 
lasts for five days. The citizen group reads background 
information and receives presentations from a panel of 
professional experts. At the end of the meeting, the participants 
develop conclusions, which are published and distributed to the 
Danish parliament. The Danish Consensus Conference method is 
used to analyze broad, complicated, and contentious social issues 
such as cloning and abortion. 
When the Danish model was conceived, these juries had to 
meet face-to-face. As with other citizen consultation practices, the 
juries are largely discursive and not connected to day-to-day 
36 TEKNOLOGI-RADET (DANISH BOARD OF TECHNOLOGY), THE CONSENSUS 
CONFERENCE, . http://www.tekno.dk/subpage.php3?article=468&toppic= 
kategori12&1anguage=uk (last visited Aug. 20, 2008). 
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policymaking. But the Danish model does have some 
consequences in that these small groups write position papers on 
policy that are directly channeled to parliament. In addition, the 
Danish Technology Board has a great deal of experience that 
demonstrates that the small-group consultative model operates 
well. 
Methods similar to those of the Danish Consensus Conference 
might easily be transposed for more active policymaking activities 
and scaled using the Internet. For example, instead of convening 
the jury to write position papers as in the Danish model, we can 
create such a small group jury to create greater accountability in 
policymaking by having the juries oversee the work of appointed 
officials. Each Assistant Administrator at EPA, for example, for 
air and radiation, solid waste and water, and each of the regional 
administrators would have a jury assigned to track his or her 
actions over the jury's term. 
The environment is clearly a hot button issue. Ordinary 
citizens are yearning for a way to have an impact upon and some 
input into the environmental crisis. While these would be 
relatively easy to organize small group exercises, such juries 
would resonate beyond the few dozen or few hundred people who 
serve. The mere existence of an avenue for engagement, even by a 
small number of "us," creates an impetus for openness. 
Unlike Federal Advisory Committees, which are closed-door 
in nature, the convening of such civic juries could be automated 
and transparent. Juries might be selected at random from a pool of 
self-selecting volunteers. · Other approaches might be tried. EPA 
might convene multiple civic juries and assign them to oversee its 
officials' work. Civic jury participants could be drawn from a mix 
of volunteers, who work in environmental industries and research 
and others who come from diverse perspectives but have an 
interest in the topic. Potential members would specify their 
profession and their interests in response to a web-based 
questionnaire, making it easier for the software platform to 
convene and communicate with such civic jury communities 
automatically. Or, members might be chosen at random from 
among the most active participants in a policy wiki community or 
from among those who participate in rulemaking activities. 
Civic juries would meet online and serve limited terms to 
ensure that members are not overburdened or entrenched. A jury 
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(or more than one) could be assigned to oversee the work of a. 
political official. Volunteers (who might be paid as in traditional 
jury service) would log in regularly to read a private blog where 
the official discloses his actions to the jury. The jury could ask 
questions, request clarification, challenge the official's actions but, 
in every case, the existence of the jury would demand that the 
official articulate reasons why a particular action was taken. The 
official would be required by enabling statute or regulation to ask 
for the jury's recommendation. Failure to follow a consensus 
recommendation would trigger a legal requirement on the part of 
the civil servant to justify the decision. That departure from the 
group's recommendation would be a matter of public record. 
This innovation is but one variation on the jury-model that 
could enable ordinary people to exert influence at the national 
level while informing policy and improving governmental practice. 
Collaborative editing technologies, known as wikis (of which 
Wikipedia is the most famous example), now make it possible for 
a distributed team of individuals to craft a document together. An · 
online group can consult about the science involved in setting the 
air quality standard, but it can also help EPA to draft the Air 
Quality Criteria Document. Rather ·than invite participants to 
comment on an already drafted document or regulation after~the­
fact, experiments in crafting pronouncements collaboratively 
should be tried sooner and with a wider audience. Again, such 
experiments should eschew closed-door, individual practices that 
create problems in traditional consultative methodologies in favor 
of new ways of technologically-enabled working that allow people 
to self-select to participate on the basis of expertise and 
enthusiasm. As in Peer-to-Patent, such a process need not cede 
agency responsibility to the public but can augment its access to 
good information. 
Some government authorities have caught the "wiki bug" and, 
often at the behest of consultants, created internal shared drafting 
platforms. But not every participant could or should put pen to 
paper (or to pixel) in the document. Good drafting requires so 
much more than good writing; there are numerous roles for people 
to assume. Hence a "policy wiki" should not simply be a way for 
everyone to write together. The agency should identify the roles 
that need to be played and construct the space for managing those 
roles and the resulting project. In other words, this would be a 
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website where the goal, such as drafting the Air Quality Criteria 
Document, is described and broken down into specific tasks that 
small groups of people can undertake. 
If the ways of getting involved are well delineated (and that's 
something participants can also help to do), there are roles for 
experts and non-experts, scientists, and enthusiasts, alike. Besides 
the writing, such work might involve: 
• Inviting experts and other participants to join the network 
• Researching the claims in the document (or draft regulation) 
and identifying environmental impact 
• Commenting on and editing particular provisions 
• Vetting, evaluating, and rating the comments of others 
• · Summarizing and translating texts into plain English 
• Analyzing positions of stakeholders and interested parties 
• Creating visualizations (diagrams, charts, and illustrations) 
to reflect and represent the draft 
• Identifying abuses, inaccuracies, and corruption, when such 
problems arise 
• Moderating discussions 
• Promoting the effort to other weblogs and websites, helping 
to get the word out, and prompting grassroots mobilization 
• Putting an electronic "bumper sticker"-an icon or button-
on one's own website to show support for and encourage 
others to get involved in the effort (the Mozilla Foundation 
encourages its users to post a Firefox button as a way to 
encourage others to download the software) 
The software could do the work of showing people in an air 
quality drafting committee the roles and tasks they have taken on 
and the rules of engagement via the computer screen. By showing 
the group back to itself and making its goals and tasks intelligible, 
the computer screen can help to strengthen· the group's sense of 
common purpose. The agency should post all the relevant data 
sets in usable formats so that members of the network can then use 
readily available data manipulation and visualization tool (Swivel 
or Many Eyes being two examples of such software), to make 
sense of and comment on that data. 
If an agency builds an open, transparent, meaningful 
framework, participants will come. Keep in mind EPA does not 
need one hundred thousand people to join a policy wiki committee 
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on the issue of lead in the air. A few thousand part1c1pants 
working a few hours each helped the USPTO find information it 
did not otherwise have. Environmental activists, academics, 
corporate professionals, students, and environmental enthusiasts-
more than just the usual corporate and interest group players-
with useful knowledge to share will then have a way to contribute 
and get involved. The network will help to do the work of 
managing the process and evaluating submissions such that the 
entire burden does not fall to overworked agency officials. If we 
design the prnctices and platforms to split up tasks into many 
smaller, fact-gathering and decision-making exercises, we will 
have diversified against the risk of defection and corruption and 
made it easier for people to participate. 
Some will challenge the efficacy and limitations of such 
collaborative strategies. Only a small percentage of open source 
software projects get built. The SourceForge repository for open 
source software collaboration is teeming with languishing 
programming projects. But the idea is not to generate only one 
solution. We want people to spark lots of ideas and to share in the 
work of vetting them. Perhaps most importantly, spurring this 
kind of engagement in the process will inevitably lead to increased 
efforts by civic groups to take action directly to affect the 
environment, better informed by understanding what government 
can and cannot do itself. 
This reciprocal interplay between institution and network is 
not limited to the federal level. Community groups and a mayor's 
office could work together-enabled by software-to propose, 
organize, and execute local greening and environmental clean-up 
projects. Obviously, such a project has to be driven by the real 
needs and demands of actual communities. 
Such a local project could exploit the latest web-based 
technology to allocate tasks and roles both to citizens and to the 
city, assigning sweep-up to volunteer participants while assigning 
the job of installing new locks on the gates of the park to the city. 
Photosynth, a new photo-documentation technology from 
Microsoft, might enable people to track· visually the progress of 
such projects over time. Photosynth software assembles 
photographs of the same location taken by disparate people with 
different cameras and from different angles into a single picture, 
allowing many people to participate in the work of documentation. 
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By moving from experiments about technology's impact on 
collaboration in the lab to work designing the mechanics of real 
institutions and networks, we might create new opportunities for 
civic engagement and improve upon the citizen participation 
practices of the pre-Internet era. The goal is to enhance mutual 
accountability between government and citizens. 
CONCLUSION 
The loci for innovation in social organizations no longer lies 
only with governmental institutions or markets but also with online 
networked communities. One potentially effective way to improve 
the environment is to enlist the efforts of ordinary people, acting 
together to help government make better decisions and to help 
each other to accomplish environmental goals. The goal should 
not be to increase lobbying or complaining. We need to make it 
possible for more people to do more effective work in groups. 
The environment is a complex system and environmental 
policy making must reflect this complexity. No one-not even the 
most talented governmentally funded scientist--can be sufficiently 
expert to make decisions about the world environment. It is 
simply not a matter of engineering. It is a matter of evolving . 
complex and adaptable systems that can interact with each other, 
over time, co-evolving with the problem. And we must embrace 
the trend towards increasing diversity and complexity of such 
interactions. 
Our strategies have to grow-have to evolve-through 
experiment and trial-and-error. We cannot be afraid, merely 
because we are in the traditional domain of law, to start small, see 
what works and try again. Inescapably, we are gardeners, not 
mechanics, and so we should think about our legal institutions as 
social organisms. In this environment, we can all play many 
productive roles by planting and weeding, fertilizing and building 
trellises. 
To those who would rely on governmental authority (or a 
limited set of institutional actors) to make environmental decisions 
based on the limited amount of attention individual citizens have to 
give to this issue, it is worth pointing out what biologist Stewart 
Kauffman terms the "fourth law of thermodynamics." He 
postulates that complex systems of autonomous agents tend to 
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become more complex over time because each time we add more 
interacting nodes in a network, we create far more potential 
interactions. 37 Precisely because we can all now spend small 
amounts of time collaborating with others, via the Internet, to take 
on projects to attack environmental policy goals, we should not 
entrust this mission solely to the government. And it is exactly 
because we all only have a limited amount of time that we need 
governmental institutions to help focus our efforts. 
Government exists to do the work of the people. But the 
Internet enables the people to do some of their own work by acting 
in groups. Governments might prefer that people use the Internet 
at most to distribute information to people. If we care about the 
work of improving the environment, we should want to use the 
Internet to enlist more workers! Network technology opens up 
possibilities for distributed communities to collaborate with 
government to ensure that environmental decision-making is based 
on better information, and, because of the increased engagement of 
all of us, is more effective. 
37 Stuart Kauffman, Investigations 2-4, 151-52 (2000); see also Eric D. 
Beinhocker, The Origin of Wealth: Evolution, Complexity, and the Radical 
Remaking of Economics 141-59 (2006); David Warsh, Knowledge and the 
Wealth of Nations: A Story of Economic Discovery (2006). The point is that 
networks potentially increase the number of different ways for people to work 
together and exchange knowledge-and that an increase in the diversity of 
such interactions increases the number of solutions available. 
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